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4.1 Introduction
This is a study of foreign exchange dealers' behavior as revealed in the
working of Reuters 2000-2, a recently developed electronic foreign exchange
trading system. It was launched in 1992 with twenty-three subscriber sites in
two countries and by September 1993 had more than 230 dealing sites in
twenty-eight cities in seventeen countries (Blitz 1993). The working of the
system is described in more detail in section 4.2. This dealing system 2000-2
(henceforward termed D2000-2) is, however, still at the developing rather than
a mature stage, and the snapshot that we have of its operations on one day—
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16 June 1993—may have become outdated and obsolete by the time that this
is published.
1
Reuters has become subject to competition in this marketplace, from Minex
and from the Electronic Broking Service (EBS). The former was established
in April 1993 by Japanese institutions and, according to Blitz (1993), is "much
used in Asia," although, as of September 1993, it did not reveal the number of
trades crossed or terminals used. EBS was founded on Wednesday, 21 Septem-
ber 1993. It cost, again according to Blitz, around £40 million to launch and
has been backed by a dozen leading banks in foreign exchange—such as Citi-
bank and Chase Manhattan—who formed a consortium with Quotron, an elec-
tronic information screen competitor with Reuters.
In September 1993, Bob Etherington, Reuters' international marketing man-
ager, would not reveal his dealing system's current volume levels, although
Blitz (1993) did report that the "system has reached [its] initial target of 1,000
trades a day, each for a minimum 1 million units of currency dealt."
2 As noted,
Minex was not then disclosing the number of trades, and EBS had not started
but was going to invite dealers "to trade in standard amounts of $5 million in
Dm/$ and £5 million in £/Dm."
Such electronic dealing systems (as contrasted with informational pages
supplying indicative bid-ask quotes, such as the Reuters FXFX page) are still
in their early stages and are highly competitive. Moreover, they may have an
important future: "Roughly 60 per cent of deals in the currency market are
now done by traders in two banks—or counterparties—who call one another
up directly. The remainder of deals are done through brokers, who bring to-
gether diverse buyers and sellers.. .. But they [the banks] complain that the
commissions charged for broking a deal are very high. Automated brokerage
terminals do the same job as humans at a reduced cost... . The banks are
attracted by the reduced cost of commission. But they fear that 2000-2 will
help monopolize the market in electronic dealing systems. Mr. Bartko [chair-
man of the EBS partnership] admits that this is one of the principal motives
for this week's launch of EBS" (Blitz 1993).
Electronic trading systems have been in use for rather longer in other finan-
cial markets, notably in standardized futures and options markets. Instinet and
Globex are two such that Reuters has again been developing. A useful taxon-
omy of the modus operandi of such electronic trading systems has been pro-
vided by Domowitz (1990, 1993).
1. Readers wanting more up-to-date information should refer directly to Reuters Limited, 85
Fleet Street, London EC4P 4AJ, United Kingdom.
2. The total amount thus traded is large in absolute amount but small relative to reported daily
turnover in this market of some $900 billion or more. We find it hard to relate the data reported
above to the BIS (1993) report in their 1992 survey that, "in the United States and the United
Kingdom, the share of deals going through such [automated dealing] systems in April 1992 was
32 and 24% respectively" (table 1, p. 21, and p. 24). Probably definitions of automated dealing
systems would have been somewhat wider, including Reuters D2000-1 as well as D2000-2, but,
even so, the above percentage seems surprisingly high.109 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
Under these circumstances, details of the workings of such systems remain
commercially sensitive. The database that we have studied, a videotape of
all the entries over D2000-2 for almost exactly seven hours for the deutsche
mark/dollar, and some sixteen minutes less for five other bilateral exchange
rates, shown on the D2000-2 screen during European business hours on
16 June 1993 (from 08:31:50 to 15:30:00 British Standard Time [BST], i.e.,
GMT +1), remains the copyright of Reuters.
3 Anyone wishing to use these
data should refer to Reuters, not to us. We should like to emphasize that this
videotape did not include, and we have not been given any access to, any infor-
mation regarding the identity of any of the parties involved in trading; all the
trades observed by us remain anonymous. Indeed, it is not possible for any
observer, even in Reuters itself, to identify which are the individual banks us-
ing the system.
Readers should keep in mind the shortcomings of these data. They represent
a short snapshot of conditions in a rapidly changing market over a year ago.
Trading undertaken over such electronic trading systems may well be, as dis-
cussed further below, not representative of the market as a whole; trading activ-
ity on D2000-2 on 16 June 1993 may have differed in some respects signifi-
cantly from that in surrounding days and weeks; the volume and characteristics
of electronic trading (over Reuters) in June 1993 may well be quite different
from that now since over a year has passed.
Given these disclaimers, why should anyone bother to read on? Despite
these shortcomings, there are, however, several reasons why this study pro-
vides new insights in the literature of high-frequency exchange rate behavior.
First, until now there have been virtually no continuous time-series data avail-
able at all on actual trades, prices, and volumes in the foreign exchange mar-
ket.
4 The 60 percent or so of deals done directly by two bank counterparties
over the telephone remain, naturally, private information. There has been little
use made of data on foreign exchange transactions intermediated by specialist
interbank brokers, no doubt partly because of commercial and confidentiality
sensitivities. The only studies currently known to us making use of such data
are by Lyons (1995, chap. 5 in this volume). Data of any kind on the character-
istics and continuous time-series behavior of actual trading transactions on the
foreign exchange market are, therefore, still rare.
5 Second, there have been so
few data on transactions in the foreign exchange market that almost all the
3. We are most grateful to Reuters in general and to Mr. Etherington in particular for allowing
us to record the quantitative details reported below.
4. There is, of course, the survey of foreign exchange business that has now been undertaken
three times at three-year intervals in April 1986, 1989, and 1992 by central banks under the aegis
of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), but this does not provide time-series data. The
volumes reported are aggregates for the month of April.
5. We have little doubt that such data will become more plentiful and easily available in the
future. But for the time being at least they have rarity value. Also, as electronic trading systems
mature, it should be of historical interest to observe how they looked and operated in the early
stages of their development.110 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
studies on this market have used data on bilateral currency exchange rates that
emanate from the indicative bid-ask prices shown on electronic screens by the
specialist information providers, for example, Reuters, Telerate, Knight Rid-
der, and Quotron. There has, naturally, been some concern whether the high-
frequency characteristics of such indicative quotes, for example, the negative
auto-correlation and the fact that the size of the spread clusters at certain con-
ventional values, are representative of the characteristics of firm (committed)
bid-ask quotes at the touch. The touch, a term more commonly used in the
United Kingdom than in the United States, is defined as the difference between
the best (highest) bid and the lowest ask on offer, where these are (usually)
input by different banks. Lyons, for example, expressed such concerns when
he wrote, "Some of the shortcomings of the indicative quotes include the fol-
lowing. First, they are not transactable prices. Second, while it is true that the
indicated spreads usually bracket actual quoted spreads in the interbank mar-
ket, they are typically two to three times as wide. ... Third, the indications are
less likely to bracket true spreads when volatility is highest since there are
limits to how frequently the indications can change. And finally, my experience
sitting next to dealers at major banks indicates that they pay no attention at all
to the current indication; rather, dealers garner most of their high-frequency
market information from signals transmitted via intercoms connected to inter-
dealer brokers [see Lyons 1993]. In reality, the main purpose of the indicative
quotes is to provide non dealer participants with a gauge of where the inter-
dealer market is trading" (1995, pp. 331-32; see also Flood 1994, esp. n. 6,
p. 154).
Do, for example, the frequency and volatility of the indicative quotes pro-
vide a reasonable proxy for the same characteristics both in the committed bid-
ask quotes and in the associated transactions in the electronic trading systems?
We provide an initial answer to such questions in section 4.3, where we seek
to compare characteristics of the FXFX time series
6 with those of the D2000-
2 data for the overlapping seven hours. As described in more detail in section
4.3, the D2000-2 series was not time-stamped, and our study of this relation is
conditional on the assumptions and techniques used to match these two
series temporally.
Subject to that condition, and to anticipate some of our main findings in
section 4.3, the averages of the bid-ask in both series (FXFX and D2000-2) are
almost identical. A graph of the time path for the deutsche mark/dollar from
the two sources looks like one line (see figure 4.1). Thus, the time path of the
indicative quotes can, on this evidence, be taken as a very good and close
proxy for that in the underlying firm series. Nevertheless, some of the charac-
teristics of the bid-ask series, for example, the pattern of autocorrelation, are
somewhat different. Even so, both series indicate a somewhat similar GARCH
6. We obtained the accompanying FXFX data series from Dr. M. Dacorogna of Olsen and Asso-
ciates in Zurich.Ill A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
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Fig. 4.1 Average of bid-ask for FXFX and 1)2000-2 data: deutsche mark/dollar
pattern. As would be expected, the two series are cointegrated, with the indica-
tive series responding more to deviations from the equilibrium (i.e., a larger
and more significant negative coefficient on the error correction mechanism).
By contrast, the characteristics of the spreads in the FXFX as compared with
the touch in D2000-2 are markedly different. The spreads in the FXFX series
show clustering among a small number of standard values (e.g., 5, 7, and 10
pips for the deutsche mark/dollar), whereas the spreads at the touch show no
such signs of clustering.
After examining the relations between the quote series and associated
spreads of FXFX and D2000-2 in section 4.3, we turn in section 4.4 to a more
detailed study of the characteristics of D2000-2, in particular, the interaction
between quotes and transactions in that data set. This long section has five
subsections. First, in section 4.4.1, we examine the statistical characteristics of
the transaction price series in D2000-2. Whereas for both D2000-2 and FXFX
the quote series incorporate a first-order negative moving average, the transac-
tion price data appear to follow a random walk. Our most interesting finding
is that the series of runs of deals, sequences of trades at the bid and the ask, is
not normally distributed but contains some very long consecutive sequences,
another fat-tailed distribution.
Second, in section 4.4.2, we examine the interrelations between the available
data series, using nine main series from D2000-2, all of which, apart from the
spread, can be separately obtained for the bid and the ask. These are the fre-
quency of transactions (deals), their size, and whether such transactions ex-
hausted the quantity currently quoted; then the frequency of quote revision,
the change in the quoted prices, and the quantity quoted; and two measures of
volatility, the absolute change in the quote and the standard deviation of the
quotes. Our main finding is that there is a two-way interrelation between the112 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
frequency of quote revisions and the, frequency of deals and that, when a deal
exhausts the quantity on offer, this then affects (with one-way causality) a
nexus of relations between volatility, spreads, and quote revisions. We also
conduct similar companion studies on the (temporally associated) FXFX data
using a smaller subset of data series (since we have no data on transaction
characteristics or on posted quantities from FXFX), but these have less inter-
esting results.
Our finding that there is a strong two-way relation between the frequency of
quote revisions and that of transactions within a period is, we believe, new,
although the underlying cause, that both derive from the arrival of "news," is
theoretically straightforward. Most studies of transactions in other asset mar-
kets (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange [NYSE]), have used data series cali-
brated in transaction (tick) time, with the result that one cannot then infer
calendar-time frequency. Otherwise, with relatively low-frequency transac-
tions on the NYSE, so many of the observations would exhibit zero change.
With much higher-frequency transactions on foreign exchange markets, it
seemed to us worthwhile to explore the form of these relations in both clock
time and transaction time, although we feel that much remains to be done in
clarifying the appropriate econometric usage in this field.
Next, in section 4.4.3, we examine the ARCH (autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity) characteristics of the quote series, in particular to discover
whether their GARCH characteristics would be affected by the addition of
transactions data. In this case, unlike most of the other main results in section
4.4.2, the results did appear sensitive to whether the exercise was run in clock
time or tick time.
Largely because much more data have been made available for the equity
market, especially the NYSE, and its associated derivative markets, there has
been much more empirical work on those markets than for the foreign ex-
change market. Moreover, the two markets are quite dissimilar in format and
microstructure, as nicely described in Bessembinder (1994). Nevertheless, de-
spite the comparatively very small size of our data set, its coverage of transac-
tions as well as quotes brings it somewhat nearer to the richer data sets avail-
able on equity markets. In particular, our study here, examining the interaction
between trades at the bid and ask and price quote revisions, has some features
in common with that of Hasbrouck's (1991) study of such effects in the NYSE.
So we then replicate his study as closely as we can, using our own data set and
adding some variations of our own.
We draw the conclusions of these exercises undertaken earlier in section 4.4
together in the final part, section 4.4.5. Throughout this work, the caveat that
our data set lasts for only seven hours, a possibly atypical period, must always
be kept in mind, despite the comparatively large number of data points. It is in
this sense a very small sample. All our findings, both positive and negative,
must be treated with caution.113 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
4.2 The Characteristics of D2000-2
Automated brokerage terminals do the same job as humans but at a reduced
cost. A bank dealer who is a member of one of these electronic systems can
enter her buy and/or sell price into them. Reuters D2000-2 and EBS show only
the touch, the highest bid, and the lowest ask; these will normally, but not
necessarily, be entered by different banks. This is different from the indicative
foreign exchange pages (e.g., FXFX), which show the latest update of the bid
and ask entered by a single identified bank. On all the electronic trading sys-
tems, the identity of the inputting bank is not shown. The quantity that the
inputting bank is prepared to trade is also shown on D2000-2. This was then
shown as integers of $1 million, and in some bilateral cases DM 1 million,
from 1-5 and entered as M (medium) for a sum between $6 and $10 million
and L (large) for sums above $10 million.
7 More than one bank may input the
same best bid (ask) price, in which case the quantity shown is the sum of that
offered by these banks. The limit orders, that is, those below the (best) bid and
above the (best) ask, and their associated firm quantities are entered and stored
in these systems but are not revealed over D2000-2 and EBS. Such reserve
limit orders are shown on Minex.
Another bank dealer and member of the trading system can then "hit" either
the bid or the ask by typing instructions on his own machine. The first check
is prudential. Banks in such systems may want to restrict the amount of dealing
with certain other counterparties (in some cases refusing to deal at all with
some counterparties). The computer first checks whether the deal is pruden-
tially acceptable to both parties (who remain at this stage anonymous). If not,
the deal is refused and the "hitter" so informed. We have no information as to
how often this might happen, but we surmise that it might be fairly rare. As-
suming that the "hit" is accepted and that several banks are offering the same
best price, their offers are met on the basis of the time of entry, first in first out.
When a new deal is made, the new transaction price enters on the right-hand
column of the screen,
8 and there must be an associated change in the quantity
of the bid (ask), depending on which is hit,
9 and also in the price offered if the
size of the deal exhausts the quantity offered at the previous price. In such
cases, the bid price must move downwards if there was an exhaustive deal at
the bid, and the ask price upward following an exhaustive deal at the ask, or
indicate that there are no remaining limit bids (asks) in the systems, that is, no
quote shown.
1
0 Note that, in an automatic system like this, a deal must be made
7. This classification has since been changed.
8. When a new deal has been made, the new transactions price initially for a few seconds shows
purple, rather than the standard black, on the screen in order to alert traders to this.
9. When the deal is completed, both banks, the hitter and the quoter, will be sent details regard-
ing to whom and where to make the payment, which is then settled in the standard fashion. So, ex
post facto, the identity of the counterparty becomes revealed.
10. Unhappily, we had a few cases in our data where this directional constraint did not hold.
While this could be due to new bid-ask inputs occurring at exactly the same moment, several of114 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
at either the posted bid or ask and cannot be made at an interior price between
them, as can happen with nonautomated human dealers, which can cause prob-
lems in empirical studies. This has been a particular problem for empirical
studies of the NYSE (see, e.g., Petersen and Fialkowski 1994; and Lee and
Ready 1991).
D2000-2 allowed traders to deal in some fifteen major bilateral exchange
rates at the time of our exercise. The number and range of currencies covered
have been changing over time, as is no doubt the case for EBS and Minex as
well. The screen for D2000-2 is not big enough to show all fifteen at once, and
in any case such a large number of separate rates might be distracting. So the
dealer on D2000-2 can call up to six bilateral exchange rate onto the screen at
any one time.
All this may be made somewhat easier to follow by seeing an example of
what a dealer would see when looking at her screen. This is shown in table 4.1.
Note, in particular, that not all the cells have entries. There are periods, espe-
cially in the less actively traded bilateral exchange rates, when no bank is mak-
ing a firm offer. A bilateral currency can have a firm bid (ask) exhibited without
there being any corresponding ask (bid) on the screen, as in this example for
the deutsche mark/French franc exchange rate; so there is no observed spread
at such times. Any bid-ask price must be associated with an accompanying
quantity offered (and vice versa). As electronic trading becomes more popular,
such gaps in prices may be expected to become fewer. Note also that the repre-
sentation of the bilateral exchange rate in the left-hand column is the reverse
of what would be normally expected, that is, row 1 would in normal usage be
described as the number of yen per dollar. (We thank a discussant for noticing
this.) The reason, we understand, for this ordering is that all the volumes are
denominated in units of 1 million of the first currency shown. Henceforth,
however, we will revert to the standard representation of the bilateral rates.
D2000-2 runs throughout the whole day during the week, apart from a short
break from 2300 GMT to 0100 GMT. On 16 June 1993, a Reuters employee
started to videotape the bilateral deutsche mark/dollar exchange rate at approx-
imately 0830 hours BST. This is the dominant and most active of all exchange
rates (see, e.g., Goodhart and Demos 1990, 1991a, 1991b). About sixteen
minutes, thirty seconds later, he also put the additional five bilateral exchange
rates that were shown in table 4.1 up onto the screen.
1
1
these cases probably arise from mistakes in transcribing the videotape (see section 4.2). When we
had identified these few errors, we removed them from the data set.
11. Reuters had decided to videotape a day (seven hours) of the working of D2000-2 for their
own purposes. We do not know why their operator chose these other five bilateral exchange rates.
There is some autocorrelation in volatility and activity in differing rates from day to day, and
maybe the operator felt that these would provide either more interest or a better representation
than the other nine available. But, basically, we do not know, just as we do not know how the
characteristics of the observations in this seven-hour snapshot compared with the same hours on

















































Note: USD = U.S. dollar; JPY = Japanese yen; DEM = deutsche mark; CHF = Swiss franc;
FRF = French franc.
It is this videotape, initially filmed for its own purposes, that Reuters was
kind enough to let us observe, subject to confidentiality commitments. There
are four Betacam tapes, which ran virtually continuously, subject to a future
minor qualification, from 0832 BST to 1530 BST (on 16 June 1993). The
screen does not show the clock time, and the entries are not time-stamped, but




As might be expected, when the commitments made on screen are firm and
deals are made at those prices, the original data are, as far as we can judge,
remarkably accurate. We ended with only a couple of data points that we felt
must be in error. This compares with errors that occur about once in every four
hundred entries over FXFX (see Pictet et al. 1994, table 5). By contrast, we
are conscious that there will be a number of transcribing errors. In particular,
whether because of the need to copy the tapes or for some other reason, the
final digit of the five-digit (in one case four-digit) number was often hard to
decipher. In particular, it was difficult to distinguish zero from eight when these
were faint on the videotape.
1
3
In one respect, fortunately, the data are self-checking. When a deal occurs,
the transaction price in the right-hand column has to be the same as the prior
(i.e., within seconds earlier) bid, or ask, that was hit and must change the quan-
tity offered at that prior price, and also the price itself, should the quantity be
fully taken up. The two series (i.e., of transactions prices, on the one hand, and
bid-ask prices and their associated quantities, on the other) were transcribed at
12. We were working at Harvard University when we sought to take the details of the tape,
every entry, from the video onto paper and then back onto electronic diskette. Since no Betacam
video machines were available in the United States, the tapes were first copied onto S-VHS, and
the entries on the S-VHS tapes were viewed over a special video player, with adjustable speeds,
forward and backward, pause, etc.
13. The transcription from video to paper was primarily done by the wives of two of the authors,
Mrs. Margaret Goodhart and Mrs. Keiko Ito, also with the assistance of Ms. Yoko Miyao, who did
this extremely complex and difficult exercise in a dedicated, patient, and conscientious fashion,
and we are most grateful to them. But there will inevitably be some errors in variables.116 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
separate times. By marrying these up
1
4 and reviewing in cases of errors, we
can both cross-check the accuracy of our transaction data and get some idea of
the remaining errors in variables for the entries (bid-ask and associated quanti-
ties offered) where no such cross-check was possible.
1
5
Turning now to the data themselves, the database divides into two separate
parts. First, there is the deutsche mark/dollar market. This is the dominant ex-
change rate in the foreign exchange market overall, and its dominance of the
electronic market in our snapshot is even more marked. There were 799 bid
entries and 823 ask entries (note that these entries would usually come from
separate banks). Quantities offered at the bid were entered on 802 occasions
and at the ask on 841 occasions. (Note that the quantity offered can, and does,
change quite frequently without an associated bid-ask price change. Similarly,
the price can change without the associated quantity being altered; this hap-
pened on more occasions than we would have expected, perhaps because a
bank changed the price for a given amount that it wanted to trade.) Although
we cannot possibly deduce the total number of independently made entries,
these might conservatively be put at around fifteen hundred in seven hours, or
two hundred or so per hour. This compares with some thirty-five hundred en-
tries over FXFX for the deutsche mark/dollar bilateral exchange rate in the
same hours, about five hundred per hour. Considering that FXFX represents
almost costless advertising and is the most commonly used indicative foreign
exchange price screen, this shows just how busy the deutsche mark/dollar mar-
ket on D2000-2 was during this snapshot.
The number of deals in the deutsche mark/dollar was also quite large, rela-
tive to the commercial target, reported in section 4.1, of one thousand per day
for deals in all fifteen exchange rates. During this snapshot, there were 186
deals done at the bid and 251 at the ask. Whether this ratio of deals to bid-ask
entries is high, low, or normal, we cannot tell. We examine whether this ratio
varied significantly from half hour to half hour over our data period in sec-
tion 4.3.
The depth of the deutsche mark/dollar on D2000-2 was fairly good, although
it can, and no doubt will, improve further. Following a deal that exhausted the
14. There were a couple of cases when we could not marry the two data points, despite several
reviews. It is this to which we referred earlier as the only examples of probable errors in the
original data.
15. Thus, the cross-check revealed that the accuracy of visually timing the exact moment of an
entry on a screen was to within about plus or minus three seconds. From the adjustments and
reviews that had to be made to marry the transaction price data with the bid-ask (and associated
quantity) data, it may well be that the final digit in the remaining data is incorrect about once every
thirty observations and the penultimate digit incorrect once every one hundred observations. Some
of our statistical anomalies, e.g., the few zero and negative spreads and the incorrect direction of
price movement following a deal, need to be seen in that context. Such inevitable human error
could have been eliminated had the data been available in electronic disk form, but that was not
on offer. Moreover, there are some advantages in getting to know the raw data thoroughly before
proceeding to econometric testing.117 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
quantity offered or the removal of a bid-ask price, most of the time there was
another limit order on the computer at a closely related price. Histograms of
quantities offered at the bid measured over both frequency and duration of
entry are shown in figures 4.2 and 4.3. The histograms for the ask are nearly
identical and have been omitted to save space. From these it can be seen that
the frequency and length of time during which no bid or ask price is on the
screen for the deutsche mark/dollar are both few and brief.
Note that the majority of the quantities offered, both at the bid and at the
ask, are usually at or below 5. Consequently, the average size of deal here is
also low. We cannot estimate it exactly because we cannot see the actual data
lying behind M and L. If, however, we take M to be 8 on average and L to be
15, then the average size of deal at the bid was $2.51 million and $2.49 million
at the ask, that is, of similar size. A recent paper by Garrett Glass (1994),
examining all foreign exchange deals over the Multinet system, puts the aver-
300
Fig. 4.2 Bid quantity frequency: deutsche mark/dollar
12000
Fig. 4.3 Bid quantity duration: deutsche mark/dollar118 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
age size of deals at about $9 million.
1
6 Be that as it may, it is the case that deals
in the deutsche mark/dollar D2000-2 market were, by this standard, unrepre-
sentatively small on average. Why this should have been so, we do not know,
but Lyons (chap. 5 in this volume) reports that the average size of deals done
through brokers is lower than that of customer deals, and his figure for the size
of average broker deals is not that much larger than that shown here.
One factor reducing the number/duration of occasions on which there might
have been no entry in the deutsche mark/dollar ask series was that a participant,
presumably a single bank, kept an off-market ask entry in the computer at
1.6475 when the market was actually running at about 1.6440. When no other
entry was better, this was triggered (see fig. 4.4). As the graph shows, the U.S.
dollar appreciated sharply thereafter, and the bank involved presumably dis-
posed of its unwanted dollars. In the meantime, however, it represented a nui-
sance entry for us, distorting the true underlying pattern of the market. No deal
was, naturally enough, done at such an off-market price, prior to the occasion
of the dollar appreciation. We decided to remove these off-market asks (be-
tween observations 250 and 450 on the ask side). We did not remove the few
asks at the same price earlier (around the fiftieth observation) since these were
not seriously off market (nor did we remove two solitary occasions of off-
market bids at 1.6405). The resulting, adjusted ask series looks as follows, as
shown for comparison in figure 4.5.
As these charts clearly show, the major events in the foreign exchange mar-
ket on 16 June 1993 were two brief periods of sharp appreciation in the U.S.
dollar, the first lasting from about 1339 BST to about 1345 BST and the second
from about 1443 BST to 1445 BST, as indicated by the time-stamp on the
FXFX data series. The average price of FXFX quote entries in each minute
during the course of these two jumps is shown in table 4.2.
The underlying cause, from "news" arrival, of these dollar appreciations
against the deutsche mark are clear enough, but their exact timing is difficult
to relate to the news items coming over AAMM (the Reuters news page) on
that day. The news on that day was "bearish" for Germany and "bullish" for
the United States (see table 4.3). Possibly the 1338-1345 BST jump in FXFX
could have been triggered by the U.S. housing figures (certainly the dollar
opened firm in the United States) and the 1442-1445 BST jump by a delayed
reaction to the German government report, but such links cannot be firmly
established. The finding here is consistent with other findings in the literature
that tend to experience difficulties matching news events to jumps in the asset
price, and vice versa. Nevertheless, one can hardly query the time-stamp on
the FXFX data, and the extent and timing of these jumps are very closely
matched by the data on D2000-2, as will be discussed further below. One inter-
16. Considering that deal size is highly skewed, we wonder whether he meant median when he




Fig. 4.4 D2000-2 ask data: deutsche mark/dollar
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Fig. 4.5 Filtered D2000-2 ask data: deutsche mark/dollar
esting feature of these jumps in the value of the dollar is that they were associ-
ated with great activity on the ask side of the market and very little action,
even in the guise of price revisions, on the bid. From 1337 BST to 1345 BST,
there were seventeen deals at the ask in D2000-2 and none at the bid. Over the
same period, there were some thirty-nine price revisions at the ask and thirteen
at the bid, two of these remaining established and unchanged for almost two
minutes each. From 1442 BST to 1446 BST, there were thirteen deals at the
ask and none at the bid. There were some twenty-six price revisions at the ask.
A few seconds after the start of the dollar appreciation, the existing bid price
was removed from the screen, and for the remaining three and a half minutes
of the appreciation no bid price at all was posted; this was the longest gap in
having a firm price set for either the bid or the ask in our data set for the
deutsche mark/dollar. Otherwise, price setting in the deutsche mark/dollar over
D2000-2 was nearly continuous.
A graphic representation of the bid-ask prices quoted, the occasion and price120 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne




























































Table 4.3 News on U.S. and German Economies
BST AAMM Report
12:13:18 "German unemployment could top 4 million—Rexrodt"
12:34:40 "Next Bundesbank rate cut seen most likely in July"
12:53:12 "German industry says economy still declining"
13:01:44 "German institute sees no recovery before mid-1994"
13:32:04 "US May Housing Starts rose 2.4%"
13:37:04 "US Home Building in May is strongest in 5 months"
13:46:54 "Bonn can live with current mark-dollar rate"
13:56:30 "German Govt source sees no danger for mark"
14:15:40 "Dlr opens firm in US, surges on German comments"
14:20:12 "US May Industrial Output rose, capacity use steady"
14:32:04 "Bonn wants lower short-term rates—Source"
14:33:48 "US May Housing Starts Rise is modest—analysts say"
14:41:08 "Mark falls against dollar after govt comments"
of deals, and the quantities offered for the deutsche mark/dollar, for the first
through the seventh hour, is shown in appendix figures 4A.1-4A.22.
Such continuous price setting was not the case for the other five bilateral
exchange rates exhibited on the screen during our seven-hour snapshot. Simple
observation revealed that market activity in these rates on D2000-2 over our
data period was far more patchy. Initially, the rates were not put onto the screen
for some sixteen minutes after the deutsche mark/dollar was shown. Thereafter,
during the following six and three-quarter hours, there were in some cases
quite long gaps in setting bid-ask prices. The average quantities dealt ranged
from just over $ 1 million (Swiss franc/dollar bid) to nearly $3 million (French121 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
franc/deutsche mark ask). The data are shown in table 4.4; the figures in paren-
theses in the table report the original average deutsche mark size when the
deals were done in units of deutsche mark 1 million. Deals were, however,
much fewer in number than for deutsche mark/dollar. When there are large
price movements, the majority of the deals seem to be purchases of the appreci-
ating currency, and the majority of quotes are on the strong side of the market
(see table 4.5). We pursue this effect somewhat further in section 4.4 below.
Data on these deals and the number of bid-ask price entries are given in table
4.4, and histograms of the bid quantities offered are shown in figures 4.6-4.10;
again, the similar ask histograms are omitted to save space.
These histograms show differing patterns. The quantities offered on the dol-
lar-based bilaterals (i.e., deutsche mark/dollar, yen/dollar, Swiss franc/dollar)
are predominantly for one or two units, with increasingly few offers made as






















































Note: Figures in parentheses report the original average deutsche mark size when the deals were
done in units of DM 1 million.
"Based on the assumption that M = 8, L = 15.
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Fig. 4.6 Bid quantity frequency: dollar/yen
Fig. 4.7 Bid quantity frequency: deutsche mark/yen
Fig. 4.8 Bid quantity frequency: dollar/Swiss franc123 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
Quantity
Fig. 4.9 Bid quantity frequency: deutsche mark/French franc
Fig. 4.10 Bid quantity frequency: deutsche mark/Swiss franc
size increases. The quantities offered on the deutsche mark-based bilaterals
(i.e., yen/deutsche mark, Swiss franc/deutsche mark, and French franc/
deutsche mark) show many more (proportionately) larger offers, quite remark-
ably so for the French franc/deutsche mark (fig. 4.9). One possible explanation
is as follows. Suppose that the European cross-rates tend to move less than the
dollar-based bilaterals; then the risk involved in building up inventories for a
dealer is less. Hence, a larger unit bid is offered. Now, the Swiss franc/deutsche
mark and French franc/deutsche mark rates should move less than the corre-
spondent currencies vis-a-vis the dollar because the deutsche mark and the
French franc are in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM), and the Swiss franc
closely follows the deutsche mark historically. Even the yen/deutsche mark
volatility tends to be less than in the yen/dollar or deutsche mark/dollar rates.
We should again stress that we have no means of knowing whether these,
somewhat patchy, results were representative of activity in these exchange rates
at other times of the day (note that activity in the yen/dollar exchange rate
might be expected to be somewhat muted in European market space) or on124 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
other days or whether they would have been representative of the nine other
unshown bilateral exchange rates. Moreover, the use of electronic market sys-
tems is developing rapidly over time. Be that as it may, the somewhat occa-
sional nature of the market, then, in these other five exchange rates means that
we will concentrate most of our econometric studies on the deutsche mark/
dollar.
4.3 Comparison of FXFX and D2000-2
As described in the introduction, indicative screen prices, as provided over
FXFX, constitute the basis for almost all current time-series studies of the
foreign exchange market. While there is no doubt that these are close enough
approximations to the underlying firm quotes for low-frequency studies (e.g.,
frequencies of one hour or longer), concern has been expressed as to whether
they do necessarily provide sufficiently close approximations to the underlying
firm data for very high-frequency studies. For example, Baillie and Bollerslev
(1991) have conjectured that the negative moving average (MA) characteristics
found in FXFX ultra-high-frequency data may be a facet of their indicative
nature and that the underlying price(s) would not exhibit this characteristic
(see also Zhou 1992; Bollerslev and Domowitz 1993; and Bollerslev and Mel-
vin 1994).
Now that we have a seven-hour snapshot of firm prices in D2000-2, we can,
in principle, make a comparison of them with the bid-ask series from FXFX
over the overlapping period for the three data sets deutsche mark/dollar, yen/
dollar, and Swiss franc/dollar. A problem, however, is that the D2000-2 data
series is not time-stamped, although it does have a time elapse shown on the
videotape. In practice, of course, the two series can be matched pretty closely
by eye alone by matching the two occasions of short-term appreciation in the
deutsche mark/dollar.
To try to match the series even more closely, we constructed artificial series
for both the D2000-2 and the FXFX deutsche mark/dollar, bid and ask, with
observations evenly spaced every five seconds. (Note that in both cases the
original series is irregularly timed and hence cannot be directly correlated.)
We assumed, for the purpose of matching (D2000-2 and FXFX) only, that the
existing price held until revised, for the purpose of interpolation, where neces-
sary. When no price was exhibited on D2000-2, we treated the prior price as
still holding, except for the gap in the bid price in the second jump, discussed
in the preceding section, where we applied a linear interpolation (between
1.6565 and 1.6590).
1
7 Alternative rules of thumb for interpolation could have
17. When we subsequently used this series for econometric work, we changed this rule of thumb
so that, when a deal exhausted the quantity offered and no price was then shown, we took the next
reported price as becoming effective. Otherwise, the estimated (absolute) price change, following
a deal, would have been biased downward.125 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
been tried, but we are confident that doing so would have made no difference
for this timing exercise.
Our crucial assumption is that price adjustments on FXFX and D2000-2
would be synchronous. We believe that to be justified. Studies made by one of
us (Goodhart 1989) of the reaction of FXFX bid and ask prices to precisely
timed news announcements (e.g., U.S. "news" released at 0830 EST) show
that these are virtually instantaneous (a few seconds at most), and we should
surely expect no slower reaction where prices represent firm commitments
(see, e.g., Ederington and Lee 1993). Accordingly, our strategy was to assume
that prices in both series would move synchronously. Given this assumption,
our approach was to compare the correlation of the two series for the deutsche
mark/dollar as we varied their temporal overlap and see which temporal over-
lap gave the best fit.
In practice, all the exchange rate action came in the second half of our data
period (the last two tapes), and the market was so flat in the opening hours
(tapes) that we could not find any clear peak in the fit when starting from the
front. We therefore worked from the back, fitting the final tape to the FXFX
data, to the front. In the event, and slightly disturbingly, we found a twenty-
second discrepancy between our best-fit timing for the comparison of the bid
and the ask series (see table 4.6). However, given our exact knowledge of how
the bid and ask series are timed relative to each other on D2000-2, we overrode
this apparent discrepancy from the time-series fitting exercise and split the
difference between the two with the result that the observations on D2000-2
are all properly aligned with each other.
This then gave us the basis for comparison of the D2000-2 bid-ask series
with the FXFX series over a closely matched data period (with the exact match
uncertain by some fraction of a minute). We have to be careful, however, in
using the interpolated five-second series themselves in econometric compari-
sons since the interpolations distort some of the characteristics of the raw data.
There were some eight hundred observations in the basic D2000-2 series and
about five thousand in the interpolated series for D2000-2. By construction,
the extra forty-two hundred observations will exhibit no change, which must
tend to drive any estimated autocorrelation toward zero and may also bias the














Note: In each case, the finish of tape t — 1 was about one second before the start of tape t. For
tape 1, the start time is given from the first quote, of deutsche mark/dollar bid and ask: the tape
starts with a blank screen almost exactly eight minutes before.126 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
ARCH characteristics. We discuss some of the issues raised by the question of
whether to scale the series by time or by tick activity at greater length in section
4.4 below.
Subject to that condition, the means of the bid-ask in both series (FXFX and
D2000-2) are almost identical. A graph of the time path for the deutsche mark/
dollar from the two sources looks like one line (see fig. 4.1). Thus, the time
path of the indicative quotes can, on this evidence, be taken as a very good and
close proxy for that in the underlying firm series. Nevertheless, some of the
characteristics of the bid-ask series (e.g., the pattern of autocorrelation) are
somewhat different. Even so, both series indicate a somewhat similar GARCH
pattern. As would be expected, the two series are cointegrated, with the indica-
tive series responding more to deviations from the equilibrium (i.e., a larger
and more significant negative coefficient on the error correction mechanism).
By contrast, the characteristics of the spreads in the FXFX as compared with
the touch in D2000-2 are markedly different. The spreads in the FXFX series
show clustering among a small number of standard values (e.g., 5, 7, and 10
pips for the deutsche mark/dollar), whereas the spreads at the touch show no
such signs of clustering.
The basic characteristics of the temporally matched, filtered (but not inter-
polated) series are shown in table 4.7. The main pattern of results shows that




The differences between the first four moments of the various price series
(bid, ask, and average of the bid and ask) in either levels or first differences are
minor. The FXFX series in levels have a somewhat lower average value (proba-
bly owing to a larger proportion of their observations coming in the earlier
part of the period; see table 4.7), an insignificantly lower volatility (standard
deviation), and marginally higher skewness and kurtosis. The FXFX series in
first differences have lower means, by a factor of one and a half in the mean
and about two or three in the bid and ask (perhaps again because of more
observations when little was happening in the early part of the period). These
FXFX differenced series have a lower skewness and a slightly lower kurtosis.
There is, however, a more marked difference in the autocorrelation data. The
FXFX series exhibit stronger negative autocorrelation in all cases and at all
lags, particularly after the first lag. This is least marked at the first lag of the
bid and ask series, where the D2000-2 coefficient is about —0.61 compared
with values of -0.62 (bid) and —0.67 (ask) for the FXFX series. In the average
series, the first lag value for D2000-2 drops to -0.37, compared with —0.61
for FXFX. After the first lag, the absolute size of the negative coefficients, and
of the t-values, drops much more rapidly for D2000-2 than for FXFX. The first
18. At some future date, we intend to construct similar tables for the raw data for the yen/dollar
and Swiss franc/dollar on D2000-2 and FXFX, temporally matched. Time did not allow us to do
so at this stage.Table 4.7 Statistical Characteristics of the D2000-2 and FXFX Time Series
Compared (deutsche mark/dollar)














































































































































































































































Note: f-values are given in parentheses.
"Since the results for the ask series are almost identical to those for the bid, we have omitted the
former to save space.
This is the first difference of the level.
cWe ran the system
A*, = a0 + o^Ax,., + e,, e, | /,_, ~ N(0, h),
h, = p0 + p,V, + P2e
2,-
dSince the bids and the asks were put in at separate times, the numbers of calculated means and




































































four lags in FXFX in each case have significant negative coefficients. This is
so only for the averaged series of D2000-2, and the sum of the negative coeffi-
cients is always considerably greater in absolute size than -1 for FXFX,
whereas it is between -0.75 and -0.90 for D2000-2.
We find relatively little difference in the GARCH data, which approximate
to IGARCH values, except that the FXFX series for the changes in the average
and the level of the spread show less persistence of volatility (a lower Bx coef-
ficient) than the D2000-2 series.
One of the main findings about the characteristics of the continuous-time
foreign exchange indicative quote series was that they appeared to have a nega-
tive moving average component. One supposition was that this could be due to
the fact that they were indicative, not firm, quotes. Now that we can observe the
firm quotes, the negative moving average does appear somewhat attenuated,
especially for the average of the bid and ask, but it remains a highly significant
feature of the time series.
The main difference between the two series occurs in the case of spreads.
The most distinctive difference relates to the numerical pattern of the spread,
with the FXFX data showing the spread clustering around certain conventional
values,
1
9 while the D2000-2 spreads, being at the touch with the bid and ask
prices being input usually by different banks, show no such clustering. Histo-
grams of the frequency of spreads at various sizes for D2000-2 and FXFX are
19. This has been widely noted (e.g., Bessembinder 1994; and Bollerslev and Melvin 1994) and
was more extensively described and analyzed in Goodhart and Curcio (1991).130 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
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Spread (basis points)
Fig. 4.11 Deutsche mark/dollar spread frequency: D2000-2 data
2000
spread (basis points)
Fig. 4.12 Deutsche mark/dollar spread frequency: FXFX data
shown for deutsche mark/dollar in figures 4.11 and 4.12. The yen/dollar and
Swiss franc/dollar charts, which show almost identical patterns, are available
from the authors.
One feature of the deutsche mark/dollar spreads in D2000-2 (fig. 4.11) is
that there are a number of occasions of zero spread; that is, the best bid and
the best ask are equal. In FXFX, when the quotes are input by the same bank,
a zero spread would signal an input error.
2
0
These comparative tables possibly understate the extent to which the two
quote series actually do move together. As shown in figure 4.1, when the two
20. Cohen et al. (1981) have persuasively argued that a dealer should always prefer to transact
with certainty at a firm bid (ask) quote rather than set an ask (bid) quote at a zero, or tiny, spread
distance from it with no immediate certainty of transaction, so on these grounds a zero spread in
D2000-2 may also represent a transcription error or a dealer error; indeed, most of these occasions
lasted for only a very few seconds. Nevertheless, we intend to discuss with practitioners whether
there may be any rationale for the existence of zero spreads on D2000-2, e.g., asymmetric trading
(execution) costs between the two sides, and, until we have done so, we have decided to let these
data stand.131 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System


























































Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses.
"MacKinnon critical 1 percent value —3.896.
interpolated series are drawn on the same graph, there appears to be only one
line. If we regress the two interpolated series for the deutsche mark/dollar to-
gether, after temporal matching, we get the results in table 4.9. As can be seen,
the respective series, for the average of the bid-ask and the bids and asks sepa-
rately, are all strongly cointegrated (as should be expected). Only in one case,
however, when the average of the interpolated FXFX series is regressed on the
average of the 2000-2 series, do the coefficients take on their ex ante expected
values with a constant insignificantly different from zero and the coefficient
on the right-hand-side variable insignificantly different from unity. Otherwise,
the constants are all significantly different from zero, with the D2000-2 bid on
average just above and its ask just below that on the FXFX series. As might be
expected, the D2000-2 bid is slightly less variable than its FXFX equivalent,
while the D2000-2 ask is a tiny bit more variable (perhaps a reflection of our
treatment of outliers in the data?).
Such a finding of strong cointegration enables us, always subject to our prior
assumption that the two series are synchronous and our temporal matching
procedure valid, to examine short-term dynamics and whether a deviation be-
tween the two series is corrected primarily by a shift in the FXFX series or in
the D2000-2 series. Our hypothesis is that, since the D2000-2 series is the
underlying firm series, the indicative FXFX series should adjust to it, rather
than vice versa. When, therefore, examining the error correction mechanism
(ECM), we expect a large, significant negative coefficient on the ECM when
the change in FXFX prices is the left-hand-side variable and a much smaller,
possibly insignificant coefficient when the change in D2000-2 prices is the
left-hand-side variable. The ECM is taken, as appropriate, from the residuals
of the equations in table 4.9.132 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
Taking the average of the bid-asks as our example (the results will not
change much for the bid or ask series individually), we ran regressions, as
follows:
A average series lr = /(lags A average series 1, lags A average series 2,
ECM).
The results can be seen in table 4.8. As expected, both the ECM and the effect
of prior changes in the underlying D2000-2 series on the FXFX series are more
strongly pronounced than the effect of the FXFX series, or the ECM, on the




Since time series on transactions (i.e., the number and value of deals) have
not been available for the foreign exchange market, variations in either the
frequency of entry or the volatility of indicative prices, or some combination
of both, have often been taken as a proxy for the volume of unobservable trans-
actions. Here, we examine whether this may have been a good proxy.
2
2 Since
we cannot, however, compare the profile of D2000-2 and total market transac-
tions, we will proceed on the presumption that the former may be a good proxy
for the latter.
For this exercise, we divide our data period into half hours for the deutsche
mark/dollar series. We take these periods from the start, with the result that the
final period is not quite a complete period. Then we compare both the fre-
quency and the size of deals in each half-hour period (as a percentage of the
total) as compared with the frequency of quote entry (as a percentage of
the overall number) and relative volatility (the standard deviation of the average
of the bid-ask in the subperiod divided by the overall standard deviation). We
also examine how the average size of spread related to these variables. The
basic results for the D2000-2 and FXFX variables are given in table 4.10. Then
simple regressions between these variables were run, as shown in table 4.11.
The results are disappointing for those who would use the indicative FXFX
data as a proxy to infer the underlying transactions series. The FXFX volatility
series is an excellent predictor of the volatility in the firm quotes of D2000-2
(e.g., [4] in table 4.11); the spread series of FXFX is a mediocre predictor of
the spreads on 2000-2, with the latter in this case being on average lower, but
much more variable, by a factor of nearly five (cf. rows SS and FS in table
4.10, and see eq. [8] in table 4.11). This must raise some doubts about certain
21. Note that the coefficients will, however, be biased downward by the interpolation process,
forcing the interpolations to take a no-change value. The /-values will be less affected by such
time deformation.
22. We cannot, of course, yet observe any time series of total market transactions. All we have
now is a short snapshot of data on transactions over D2000-2. If the temporal profile of transactions
over D2000-2 should be an inaccurate and biased proxy for the total volume of transactions, then
the question of whether the indicative FXFX data provide a good predictor of concurrent D2000-
2 deals would not have much importance.—i — Os
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Table 4.11 Deutsche Mark/Dollar: Half-Hour Relations, D2000-2 and FXFX
Left-Hand-/Right-Hand-Side Variables Constant bx b2 b3 R
2
(1) SF/FF -6.8 1.95 .25
(-1.1) (2.32)
(2) SD/FF -6.9 1.96 .25
(-1.1) (2.32)
(3) SD/SF .4 .94 .86
(•8) (9.12)
(4) SV/FV -.0 .88 .98
(-.7) (27.11)
(5) SD/SV 5.7 11.30 .36
(7.14) (3.95)
(6) SD/SV, SF .3 -.46 .96 .85
(.3) (-.17) (6.41)
(7) SD/FF, FV -6.9 1.78 9.30 .59
(-.15) (2.83) (3.33)
(8) SS/FS -31.1 5.27 .34
(-2.3) (2.80)
(9) SS/SV 3.7 21.23 .85
(7.7) (8.67)
(10) FS/FV 6.8 1.79 .51
(64.4) (3.82)
(11) SD/FF, FV.FS -33.0 2.45 3.48 3.11 .64
(-1.9) (3.34) (.75) (1.54)
(12) SD/SF, SV, SS .3 .96 -.64 .01 .84
(.2) (6.06) (-.11) (.03)
Note: /-statistics are given in parentheses. Initial F stands for FXFX series; initial S for System
D2000-2. Second letter F represents frequency of quote entry; D is number of deals; V is volatility;
and S is spread. So SF is frequency of quote entry over System D2000-2; FF is frequency of quote
entry over FXFX; SD is the number of deals on D2000-2; SV is the volatility of D2000-2, etc.
aspects of the results of recent empirical studies based on FXFX data (e.g.,
Bollerslev and Melvin 1994; and Bessembinder 1994). This is discussed fur-
ther in section 4.4.2. The frequency of quotes series on FXFX was a relatively
poor predictor of the quote frequency on D2000-2. Unfortunately, the impor-
tance of these series as a predictor of deals is largely in reverse order in this
data set. As can be seen (eqq. [3], [6], and [12]), the frequency of quote entries
over D2000-2 is the dominant predictor of the number of deal entries, with
neither volatility (whose coefficient was even wrong signed) nor spreads being
significant. But FXFX entry frequency is a poor predictor of D2000-2 quote
entry frequency. Thus, using FXFX data to predict the number of D2000-2
deals was not very successful. The frequency of entry (FXFX) was the most
significant variable for predicting D2000-2 deals of the data series available
over FXFX (eqq. [2], [7], and [11]), but both FXFX volatility and spreads
made some positive contribution. We are fully aware of the small size of this
sample among many dimensions, length of time, number of observations, etc.135 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
While more work is undoubtedly needed, we must warn that this preliminary
exercise suggests that it would be dubious to try to infer transaction frequency
from the more widely available FXFX indicative quote data.
2
3
To sum up, in this section we have sought to compare the characteristics of
the D2000-2 and FXFX series over a temporally matched period. The main
result is that the time paths for the prices quoted over the two series are ex-
tremely close and that most of the time-series characteristics of the two quote
series are closely similar. The negative autocorrelation is somewhat attenuated,
but still highly significant, in the firm D2000-2 series. As expected, the distri-
bution of spreads is markedly different between the indicative series, which
clusters at certain round numbers, and the touch with a much more even distri-
bution.
The size of spreads and the frequency of quote entry showed much more
variation between subperiods in the D2000-2 series than in the FXFX, and the
latter were not good predictors of their D2000-2 counterparts, unlike FXFX
volatility, which like its mean value matched D2000-2 almost exactly. This
meant that the FXFX data proved to be poor predictors of the frequency of
deals over D2000-2 for the deutsche mark/dollar since this was most closely
associated with the frequency of quote entries in that same data set.
4.4 The Interaction of Transactions and Bid-Ask Quotes on the
Foreign Exchange Market
4.4.1 Characteristics of Transactions Data
In the preceding section, we asked how accurate a proxy the commonly
available FXFX data were to the underlying firm D2000-2 quotes (excellent as
a guide to price movements) and to the spreads and number of underlying
transactions over the same data set (which suggested that a lot of caution would
be needed). In this section, we test certain hypotheses about the determinants
of the occurrence and size of such transactions and their effect in turn on quote
revision. We concentrate solely on the deutsche mark/dollar series here be-
cause only in this series are there sufficient data points.
Our first hypothesis is that the time series for transactions prices (returns)
will be random walk. This is the standard efficient markets hypothesis. Most
of the evidence of autocorrelation in returns in stock markets has related to
discrete break points in markets, that is, market openings and closings, week-
end effects, and end-tax-year effects (see, e.g., Dimson 1988; Mclnish and
Wood 1991; Wood, Mclnish, and Ord 1985; Griffiths and White 1993). The
23. We also ran a similar exercise, using hourly data, for the Swiss franc/dollar series, but, with
only fifty-one deals in our data period, this was too affected by small sample problems to provide
a useful cross-check. Data on this are available from the authors.136 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
foreign exchange market exhibits fewer discrete break points; in any case, our
sample is far too small, covering no such break points, to hope to test for any
such anomalies.
We exhibit the characteristics of the transactions data separately for transac-
tions at the bid and the ask and also for the two series taken together (to see
what the effect on the characteristics would be if, counterfactually, we could
not distinguish between deals at the bid and the ask; see table 4.12). During
our short snapshot, the deutsche mark/dollar traded upward (i.e., the dollar

























































































































Note: f-statistics are given in parentheses.137 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
appreciated). So the mean change on all three series was positive, but less so
for the composite series because of bouncing between deals done at the bid
and the ask.
Because of that same bounce, the absolute size of the negative autocorrela-
tion on the first lag becomes larger (almost doubles) and becomes significant.
Thus, we claim to be able to document here the statistical effect of the bounce.
It would be possible to use these data to check the accuracy of the Roll (1984)
model whereby the size of the bid-ask spread is estimated using only transac-
tion prices. We leave that for later work, although we doubt whether that model
would perform well, for example, because the direction of deals is autocorrel-
ated and information asymmetry (volatility) is time varying. The positive coef-
ficients at higher lags on the other two series may be owing to the large jumps
in the dollar during our short data period. Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993,
1430-32; see also Bollerslev and Domowitz 1991) generate artificial transac-
tions series from automated trade execution algorithms that exhibit positive
first-order serial correlation; we find no sign of that outcome in our data set of
actual transactions prices.
Hasbrouck and Ho (1987) find that, for the NYSE, "the pattern consists of
a large negative auto-correlation at the first lag, followed by positive auto-
correlations of decreasing magnitude that are statistically significant ...
through the fifth lag. The negative first order auto-correlation in transactions
data is consistent with the findings of other studies. The positive auto-
correlations, however, are (in transactions data) new" (1039). While the size
and significance of our coefficients are considerably less, the general pattern
in our data is exactly the same. With the significant negative first-order auto-
correlation being caused by the bounce and none of the later positive autocorre-
lations being either large or significant, our results are, not surprisingly, consis-
tent with efficiency.
The Dickey-Fuller test indicates stationarity. This does not disturb us. The
random walk characteristic of asset prices results from their subjection to a
sequence of "news" shocks. At any one point of time, the market price of an
asset should have an equilibrium value, dependent on assessments of past
"news" shocks. If the time period is short enough, here only seven hours, the
amount of additional "news" is limited, so, over very short time periods, one
might expect to observe stationarity.
What we do feel remains to be clarified and modeled is the nature of the
interaction between a quotes series that shows clear evidence of a negative
moving average component and a transactions series that exhibits no such sig-
nificant autocorrelations. This is the subject of our ongoing research.
According to the simplified models wherein a single dealer undertakes one
transaction of a standardized size per period, the dealer should adjust prices
until the expectation of a transaction at the bid next period is equal to one at
the ask. So the sequence of deals between bids and asks should be random
(see, e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer 1988, 1989; and Hasbrouck and Ho 1987). If138 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
inventory effects are present, the sequence might be expected to show some
negative autocorrelation. With many dealers posting limit orders and multiple
orders possible in any finite period, we would, however, not expect that. In-
stead, we would expect runs of deals of each kind. We test that hypothesis,
both by a histogram showing the lengths of sequences of deals of both kinds
and by a formal runs test.
The histogram, figure 4.13, shows that there are a number of runs of deals,
at both the bid and the ask, that are much longer than one might normally
expect to see. These are shown in table 4.13, together with their individual
expected probability of occurrence. The probability of finding all such runs
together is infinitesimal. Thus, rather like the kurtotic characteristic of the price
change series, the run series for deals appears to have a fat tail. As noted earlier,
there are indications that runs of similarly signed deals occur when the price
series is trending in one direction, for example, dollar buying at the ask where
the dollar is appreciating. We show the associated change in the relevant
quoted price during each run over the same period in table 4.13.
The formal runs test that we use is the Geary test. This concentrates attention
on whether the number of runs observed in the sample is large or small relative
to the number that one would expect to occur in a strictly random sample.
According to this test, we are led to reject strongly the null that successive
observations are independent since the test statistic is —7.11 compared to the
standard normal critical value of —2.58 under the null.
Some earlier empirical work has also found evidence that deals tend to run
in sequences (bid deals followed by bid deals and ask deals followed by ask
deals), for example, Hasbrouck and Ho (1987) and Lease, Masulis, and Page
(1991) for the NYSE. Some of the reasons for this are straightforward, for
example, a trader with a large order working up the limit order book. We


































































Note: Percentage price change represents the percentage difference in the quotes on the stated side
of the market at which the first and last transaction in each run took place. Sample probability is
simply the probability, given the sample frequency of each type of deal, of observing n successive
transactions on one side of the market, assuming that they are independent events.
strate, that the extent of autocorrelation revealed here is considerably beyond
the explicable on the basis of such simple microstructural factors.
The only theoretical explanation yet given for such positive autocorrelation
is by Admati and Pfleiderer (1989). They suggest that market dealers may
shade the costs of dealing, on one side of the market, to encourage liquidity
traders to bunch together on that side, isolating and identifying informed trad-
ers on the other: "The intuition behind our results suggests that there will be
periods in which prices rise at a slow rate when shares are purchased but fall
at a more rapid rate when shares are sold. These periods will be periods of
concentrated buying—periods in which it is expected that discretionary buyers
will be trading" (Admati and Pfleiderer 1989, 209). Our results are very differ-
ent. In our data, buys concentrate together when prices are rising rapidly and
spreads rising, but not enough to choke off the stream of purchases. At such
moments, seller-initiated trades dry up altogether. Further research to check
whether our results are typical of the foreign exchange market and, if so, what
the reasons for this might be would be desirable.
4.4.2 The Interrelations between the Data Series
Given the existence of such long runs of deals at the bid and ask, one vari-
able that may help predict the occurrence of a deal at the bid (ask) is whether
there has been a prior deal at the bid (ask). Hence, we now turn to regression
analysis to explore the interrelations between our series, separately for both
D2000-2 and FXFX. For this purpose, we used our constructed five-second
data set, where for D2000-2 a nonentry at either the bid or the ask is replaced
by the prior entry, if no deal had occurred, or the subsequent entry following a140 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
deal. There was never more than one deal in any five-second period, but, of
course, over longer periods (e.g., one minute) there were often several deals.
For D2000-2 we had the data series shown in table 4.14 for both the bid and
the ask; bid series are given the notation B and ask series A. There were thus
seventeen basic series for D2000-2, eight bid, eight ask, and the spread. Ini-
tially, we used our five-second database, with lags covering the previous two
thirty-second intervals and the two minutes before then, for example,
BDj_6, BD7_12, BD13_24, BD25^36,
noted as BD6, BD12, BD24, BD36. In some cases, for example, for spreads and
quote revisions, we also used shorter-unit (five-second) lags, noted as Lag 1,
Lag 2, Lag 3, etc.
For FXFX, we did not have the first three series, (BD, BDQ, BDE) or QB,
so there were four basic series in this case, with similar notation (DB, BF,
ADB, and BV), for bid quotes, four for asks, and the spread. This meant that
we had over eighty-five basic series (including lags) for D2000-2 and a data
set of five thousand observations.
2
4 Our basic approach was to regress each
variable of interest on lagged values of all the variables (including the lagged
dependent) separately and then include significant values from these first-stage
equations in a larger equation to search for the best-fitting equation.
There is a general problem in such exercises of how to scale the data. The
two main alternatives are to use standard clock time or transactions (tick) time,
whereby each activity observation is ordered consecutively, irrespective of the
varying time gap between them. With very high-frequency series, for example,
five-second intervals as here, a problem with the use of clock time is that most
observations of price changes, deals, etc., are zero. Hence, the distribution of
these variables is nonnormal, with a spike at zero. On the other hand, there are
certain questions relating to the temporal relations between series, especially
in multivariate analysis, that can be answered only using a clock-time scale.
Several analysts have wrestled with this problem, notably Mclnish and Wood
(1990, esp. sec. 4.4) with respect to the NYSE and the various studies under-
taken by analysts at Olsen and Associates (e.g., Mtiller et al. 1990; and Dacor-
ogna et al. 1993) of the foreign exchange market. Most empirical work in both
stock and foreign exchange markets, has been performed on an activity scale,
utilizing tick-by-tick data. The studies (e.g., on price scaling laws), notably
those carried out by Olsen and Associates, do suggest that this is probably
preferable, where feasible, for the question under consideration. In our case,
however, we are interested in multivariate intertemporal relations, so we have
primarily used a clock-time scale but have, in certain cases, checked the result
from these exercises against similar exercises on an activity scale.
24. Our computer could not handle a general to specific exercise with parameters of this size,
although there was relatively little multicollinearity or autocorrelation (apart from the spread, S,
which was strongly positively autocorrelated in D2000-2). We ran a simple cross-correlation ma-
trix, which is too large to reproduce but is available from the authors.141 A
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Number of deals m period
Quantity traded in deal
Dummy if deal exhausted quantity
Change in quote
Quantity quoted
Frequency of quote revision over period
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The following exercises are quite detailed. The relevant tables are tables
4.15-4.32 below. Readers may prefer to skip first to the figures showing, quali-
tatively, the main directions of relations (figs. 4.14a-c below) and also to the
summary of main findings in section 4.4.5 before deciding how much detail in
the next few pages they want to absorb.
There were only some 186 bid deals in the deutsche mark/dollar during the
more than five thousand five-second intervals. So, to examine the likelihood of
a bid deal occurring, we used probit analysis. Our "best" equations for the
probability of bid and ask deals occurring are shown in table 4.15.
The main finding from this, which was foreshadowed in the results in table
4.11 above, is that the most important set of variables to determine bid (ask)
deals is the frequency of bid (ask) quote revisions in the previous few minutes.
This frequency, we believe, is probably a proxy for the extent of prior informa-
tion. When lagged values of BF (AF), the frequency variable, are entered, lags
of the dependent variable BD (AD) lose most of the significance they had when
entered alone. Besides this frequency variable, in both cases, if there was a
deal of the opposite sign (e.g., AD6 in the BD equation) in the previous thirty
seconds, there is less likelihood of seeing a deal now. Bid deals in the deutsche
mark/dollar are considerably more likely to occur where current spreads are
low (i.e., prices are good) and when prices have recently been improving (DB6
is positive). This suggests that traders are doing their job effectively (i.e., hit-
ting comparatively good prices). A comparison of average spreads when there
is no deal and when there is a deal for the deutsche mark/dollar and the yen/
dollar is shown in table 4.16.
2
5
The AD (ask deal) results are more problematic, with some nonintuitive
variables entering significantly, that is, a. positive lagged spread (thirty seconds
previous), positive changes in bid quotes, and a deal quantity variable, ADQ.
We surmised that these results might have been due to many of the ask deals
25. Note that the split of the period into subdivisions differs slightly between table 4.10 and
table 4.16.142 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
Table 4.15 Probability of Observing Deals
A. Bid
Probit estimates:







Log likelihood = -732.90769






































Number of observations = 4,980
X





Log likelihood = -952.29651
























































Note: bd = bid-side deals; ad = ask-side deals.
occurring in the latter part of the period, when spreads and volatility were high
and both bid and ask quotes prices rising markedly. In order to test this, we
divided our sample into two parts, the flat first half (observations 1-3560) and
the upward-trended second half (observations 3561-5000), and redid the probit
analyses for both the bids and the asks. The results for bid deals remained








































Spreads: A Comparison of Spreads at Ordinary Times with Those at
Transaction Times







































































































Note: (1) Each hour has a maximum of 720 observations (five-second intervals). If an ask or bid
is missing, then that bracket is not counted in the left-hand-side panels of "all" observations. (2)
Transaction time bid-ask spread is the bid-ask spread of the five-second bracket, preceding the
five-second bracket where a transaction occurs. There are instances where transactions occur even
without one of the bid or ask being shown on the screen (just before the transaction is recorded).
These are treated as missing observations in the right-hand-side panels.
the first half and insignificant in the second part; and the change in the ask
price (DA36) also enters negatively, as expected, in the first half of the period.
Apart from the insignificant spread, the results for the first part ask are similar
to those of the contemporaneous bid. The table giving these two half-period
results is available on request from the authors.
Overall, however, the fit was rather poor. Perhaps it was expecting too much
of the data to be able to predict the probability of a deal within a period as
short as five seconds. So we lowered the frequency of analyzed periodicity to
a minute. Within a minute, however, there were often several deals. So we used
ordered probit analysis to estimate the interrelations. Somewhat to our sur-
prise, the change of periodicities to the lower frequency of one-minute inter-144 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
vals made relatively little difference to the major apparent patterns of relations
(see table 4.17).
Given the probability of a deal, the next question is what will be the volume,
the size of the deal. In 145 of 186 deals at the bid and 179 of 251 deals at the
ask, the deal, however, exhausted the outstanding quantity offered. So the size
of the deal was usually limited by the amount on offer. That means that it is
more sensible to try to model the amounts offered by the dealers (BQ and AQ)
than the amounts sought by the hitters (i.e., the supply function is better identi-
fied than the demand function).
Similarly, of course, the price of the deal has to be at the price posted, either
the bid or the ask, in the firm quotes. So we turn next to an analysis of the
determinants of the changes in such prices, DA and DB. As noted earlier, when
a quote is hit and exhausted, the price must change to the next limit order, if
such exists. There is also known to be negative autocorrelation in the quote
series. Our first basic exercise was, therefore, to regress DA and DB against
their first six, t— 1 to t—6, own lags and the dummy exhaust variable, BDE and
ADE, taking the value 1 when the quote was exhausted by a deal. The results
Table 4.17 Ordered Probit Analysis on Data at One-Minute Intervals
A. Bid-Side Deals
Number of observations = 403
X





Log likelihood = -320.24















































Note: db = change in bid quote; da = change in ask quote.145 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
are as shown in table 4.18. The value of the dummy exhaust variables (BDE
and ADE) was in each case about ± .000375, showing that this is the average
price revision (down following a bid exhaust, up after an ask exhaust), or alter-
natively the gap between limit orders, following a deal. The negative values
for the lagged own values are consonant with the now-well-established high-
frequency negative autocorrelation.
The lower value of the coefficient on the first lag than in table 4.7 above is
due to the fact that the series here are on clock time, five-second intervals, and
not taken, as in table 4.7, by consecutive quotes. Consequently, most of the
observations on price changes show zero. When we reran the exercise on ex-
Table 4.18 Basic Determinants of Quote Revision


















A. Bid Quote Revision
Number of observations = 4,976
F(7,4969) = 87.9
























B. Ask Quote Revision
Number of observations = 4,976
F(7,4969) = 114.1
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actly the same basis but omitting those observations when prices changes were
zero, we got the results shown in table 4.19. The absolute size of the coeffi-
cients of the lagged dependent variables increases by a factor of about five
times (as the 80 percent of zero observations in the complete, clock-time, sam-
ple are removed), but the standard errors increase by as much, or slightly more,
so the ^-values actually decline, just, on balance. Since there virtually has to
be a change in price after a deal exhausts the previous quote entry, coefficients
of the deal exhaust dummies, BDE and ADE, rise only slightly, and, with a
commensurately higher standard error, their f-values fall from around 20 to
Table 4.19 Basic Determinants of Quote Revision:
Tick by Tick
A. Bid Quote Revision
Number of observations = 727
F(7,720) = 34.2





Root MSE = .0005


























B. Ask Quote Revision
Number of observations = 747
F(7,740) = 43.1





Root MSE = .0004
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about 9. The resultant series without the zeroes (i.e., in transaction time) is
much more variable, so, although the fit of the series is much improved (the
adjusted R
2 doubles from around .12 to about .25), the root MSE also doubles.
We then explored to find other variables that might contribute significantly
to the determination of quote revision, although the own lags out to t—6 and
the exhaust dummy remained the key variables. The main additional variables
that entered in table 4.20 were the spread with a one-period lag, negatively for
the ask and positively for the bid (i.e., where the spread was unusually large,
someone would come forward with a more competitive quote); longer own
lags (although this was more apparent in equations run without the spread, as
shown in table 4.21); and some volatility variables.
2
6
When the spread variable is not included, changes in the ask price have a
strong positive effect on changes in the bid price, whereas changes in the bid
price had a weaker effect on changes in the ask prices (see the coefficients
italicized in table 4.21). But the sum of the coefficients is well below unity.
What this means is that, in this market, a change in the best bid (ask) has only
a slight effect on the contemporaneous ask (bid). Most of the immediate effect
becomes translated into a changed spread, which is highly positively autocor-
related. The spread returns toward normal only slowly. So, in this market, with
best bids and asks being entered by different banks, the hypothesis that these
two quotes will be revised closely and quickly in step with each other is con-
vincingly refuted; instead, bids and asks vary somewhat independently, rather
like two variables that are cointegrated in the longer run, with the spread acting
as the error correction mechanism between them.
We have no convincing explanation for the asymmetry whereby the change
in the ask quote price had a stronger effect on the bid quote price than vice
versa. We initially thought that this might be due to the surge in the value of
the dollar in the second half of the period, affecting first ask deals and quotes
and thereafter bid quotes, but, when we divided the period into two and reran,
this hypothesis was refuted since, although the effect of DA on DB was slightly
weaker than in the full sample, it was clearly stronger in the first, untrended
part of the period than in the second part, when the dollar strengthened.
We also looked for any signs that either the event or the size of deals influ-
enced quotes, apart from the exhaust dummies, which, as already noted, were
highly significant. We found generally rather weak effects, as in table 4.20
below, of these variables on quote revisions, but where significant usually of
the expected sign. Thus, in some of the equations for bid quote revisions, DB,
the event (BD) or the quantity (BDQ) of a deal in prior periods would enter
26. Such volatility variables were usually AVI2, or sometimes BV60, in the ask price change,
DA, equation and ADB in the bid price change, DB, equation. Rather counterintuitively, this latter
variable was positive in the DB equation, and, when it entered, AVI2 was negative in the DA
equation, implying that higher volatility led to finer, more competitive prices being posted, but the
significance level of this is not high.148 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
Table 4.20 The Determinants of Quote Revision
A. Bid Quote Revision
Number of observations = 4,976
F(13,4963) = 64.4





Root MSE = .0002







































































B. Ask Quote Revision
Number of observations = 4,975
F( 11,4964) = 76.5





Root MSE = .0002
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Table 4.21 Quote Revisions
A.



















Change in Ask Quote (da)
Bid Reaction to Changes in Ask Quotes
Number of observations = 4,975
F( 16,4959) = 48.1










































Ask Reaction to Changes in Bid Quotes
Number of observations = 4,975
F( 16,4959) = 51.6
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Table 4.21 (continued)






with a significant negative sign (and, even more occasionally, AD or ADQ
lagged would enter with a positive sign), suggesting that stronger deal activity
at the bid (ask) caused bid quotes to be lowered (raised). The same feature also
occurs weakly for DA, with AD entering positively, as shown in panel b of
table 4.20.
Again, we examined how the results would change if we ran the regressions
omitting all zero price change entries (80 percent of the sample). The results
are shown in table 4.22. Our process of trying to eliminate insignificant vari-
ables resulted in almost identical "best" equations, with and without zero price
changes, but the relative importance of the coefficients as measured by their
f-values changed.
2
7 The fit, as before, improves sharply once zero price
changes are omitted, with the adjusted R
2 improving threefold in the bid price
equation (to 0.43) and more than doubling (to 0.33) in the ask price equation.
But, with a more variable series, the root MSE also again doubles.
We next compared our results for the determination of quote revision over
D2000-2 with a similar exercise for FXFX (see table 4.23). The results for
DFXB and DFXA showed similar features for the lagged dependent variable
with strong negative autocorrelation (a first-order negative moving average pat-
tern) and a significant role for the spread (positive in the bid equation, negative
in the ask). Again as in the D2000-2 equations, volatility variables appear to
enter, but in rather a complicated way. Thus, the absolute change in the ask
price enters the determination of the change in both the ask and the bid price
at two separate lags with reversed signs. Tests over a longer run of data are
needed to resolve whether, and how, prior volatility affects price quote revi-
27. The absolute size of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables increased by a factor
of over three times for bid prices but nearer eight times for ask prices. With their standard errors
rising by a factor of over five times in both cases, the /-values of the lagged dependent variables
fell for bid price changes but rose for ask price changes (relative to those in table 4.20). As before,
the t-values of the deal exhaust variables fell from nearly 20 to about 5. By contrast, the coefficient
on the lagged spread variable rose sharply in the bid price equation, where the size of the coeffi-
cient rose by a factor of ten and the /-value also increased. (Note that we did test that the spread
with six lags entered more strongly than the spread lagged once in the ask price change equation.)
Otherwise, the residual variables that entered significantly changed around slightly; a variety of
volatility variables still entered weakly without any clear, or intuitive, direction of effect, and,
again, the effects of previous large quantities of ask deals (AD6 and ADQ24) tended to raise both
bid and ask quotes.151 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
Table 4.22 The Determinants of Quote Revision: Zero Changes Omitted:
Tick by Tick
A. Bid Quote Revision
Number of observations = 727
F( 14,713) = 40.6





Root MSE = .0004











































































B. Ask Quote Revision
Number of observations = 747
F{\ 1,736) = 33.7





Root MSE = .0004
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Table 4.23 The Determination of Quote Changes over FXFX
A. Bid Prices
Number of observations = 4,983
F(10,4973) = 96.1





Root MSE = .0002
























Number of observations = 4,983
F(9,4974)= 117.5





Root MSE = .0002



































































sion, either over D2000-2 or over FXFX. The other variables tested (i.e., the
prior frequency of quote revision, the absolute change in lagged bid prices,
etc.) were not significant.
In D2000-2, unlike FXFX, changes in the bid (ask) price initially become
incorporated into the spread, which is highly positively correlated. Indeed, the153 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
first-order autocorrelation with the spread in the previous five-second period
has a coefficient of about 0.88 and a f-value in excess of 50, as will be shown
below. In order to lessen the power of this relation and show the effects of
other variables, we mostly worked with a lagged dependent variable with a
thirty-second lag, Lag 6 s. Once again, a deal that exhausts a quote will force
a price revision and an increase in the spread as the price shifts to the next limit
order, so BDEr_j and ADE,^ were always entered. Thus, the basic equation
was
S = .000220 + 0.620 5_6 + .000179 BDE_, + .000313 ADE,_,
(0.000015) (0.011) (0.000047) (0.000042)
R
2 = 0.398.
As earlier noted, an increase in the bid price will reduce the spread, and an
increase in the ask price will increase it. These results came through strongly
in the equations. The standard finding is that volatility will increase spreads,
and this was also strongly supported, as shown by the significant /-values on
AV and BV. Our basic equation, using St_6 as the lagged dependent variable,
is shown in table 4.23. When Sf_, is introduced instead, the fit improves, but
the significance of all the other variables weakens dramatically, and even the
sign of the other independent variables often goes wrong since almost all their
influence is incorporated into St_v as shown in panel B of table 4.24. Besides
the exhaust dummies, price revision, and volatility variables, we also looked to
see whether either the event or size of deals or the frequency of quote revisions
affected the spread. The answer is generally no, once the significant variables
above are also entered. As can be seen from table 4.23, the number of bid
deals in the thirty seconds from f-30 to f-60 (i.e., BD12) enters with a negative
significant coefficient.
There is some uncertainty in the literature about what relation to expect
between the volume (number) of transactions and the spread. On theoretical
grounds, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) ex-
pect liquidity trading to cluster together so that low adverse selection trading
costs should occur at times of high volume; yet there is evidence in both the
NYSE (Foster and Viswanathan 1993) and the foreign exchange market
(Glassman 1987) that the intraday pattern is for spreads to be positively corre-
lated with volume. Bessembinder (1994) seeks to resolve this conflict by dis-
tinguishing between expected and unexpected volumes, with the expected
signs on these being found to be, as hypothesized, negative and positive. We
do not, however, feel that our relatively weak finding of a negative coefficient
on a volume variable helps resolve this problem; we are inclined to dismiss
this finding as possibly occurring by chance; its significance, along with that
of many other variables, was cut back sharply when St_l was entered as the
lagged dependant variable.





















A. With Lagged Dependent S,_6
Number of observations = 4,980
F( 16,4964) =


















































































B. With Lagged Dependent, S,_,
Number of observations = 4,980
F( 16,4964) = 1460.7





Root MSE = .0003





























































































metries and high volatility will be associated with high spreads.
2
8 This has been
found in two recent articles using FXFX data. Bollerslev and Melvin (1994)
and Bessembinder (1994). We have, however, shown earlier (tables 4.10 and
4.11 above) that the form of the (numerical) relation (the coefficients) between
volatility and spreads differs depending on whether D2000-2 or FXFX data
are used.
So next, for comparison, we examined the determination of spreads on
FXFX for the same deutsche mark/dollar exchange rate over the same period.
The results of this (see table 4.25) show that, besides positive autocorrelation
(although much weaker than in D2000-2, the coefficient on the first lag drops
from 0.88 to 0.38), the spread is again positively related to volatility
(ADFXB24). There is also a weak relation with the frequency of quote entry,
but the coefficients are of equal and opposite sign, so the net effect is negligi-
ble. Most of the variation in spreads in FXFX is just noise, with an adjusted R
2
of 0.15, as compared with over 0.75 for D2000-2.
We then looked at the factors affecting the absolute change in prices (a mea-
sure of the volatility) of bid (ADB) and ask quotes (ADA) both in D2000-2
and in FXFX. The results of this part of the exercise were not particularly
exciting (see tables 4.26 and 4.27 as well as n. 29).
28. Much of the literature on spreads, especially for spreads in the NYSE, seeks to distinguish
between the effects of trading costs, inventory costs, and information asymmetry (e.g., Madhavan
and Smidt 1991). We cannot attempt a similar exercise as we have no measure of inventories,
unlike Lyons (1995).
29. Obviously, the exhaustion of the quote by a deal would cause a jump in prices, so, in the
equations to explain the absolute change in prices in D2000-2, ADB and ADA, BDE and ADE
were entered into their respective equations. The lagged dependent variable and the absolute
change in quote revision on the other side (e.g., ADA in the ADB equation) were quite strongly
significant. The prior event of deals (AD and BD), but not their size (BDQ and ADQ), and the
frequency of price revision (AF and BF) were also a positive, but somewhat weaker, influence on
the absolute value (volatility) of price change. The size of ask quotes (AQ) appeared to affect the
absolute value of ask price changes, although the two lags that entered had offsetting effects. Two
of our (better) representative equations are given in table 4.26. Again, we undertook the companion
exercise of looking at absolute price changes on FXFX. Apart from the lagged dependent vari-
ables, the spread entered with a significant positive coefficient. Presumably, this is picking up
some (expected) determinants of volatility (not otherwise caught by the lagged dependant vari-
ables). The change in ask prices enters the equation explaining the absolute change in ask prices,
whereas the frequency of quote entries enters the similar equation for the bid prices. With price
movements in the bid and ask being much more closely tied together and similar for FXFX than
for D2000-2, here we show only the former equation in table 4.27 since the latter (apart from the









Determination of FXFX Spreads
Number of observations = 4,927
F(5,4967) =






































As described earlier, the frequency of quote revision (BF and AF) Granger-
causes the event of deals. The reverse causal relation also holds, with the num-
ber of recent deals influencing the frequency of quote revision. This is consis-
tent with the hypothesis that trading activity itself generates revisions of prior
information and hence further trading (e.g., French and Roll 1986). Thus, BD6
is the dominant influence on BF and AD6 on AF. Besides this, there is a weak
positive effect from the lagged dependent variable and from the lagged fre-
quency of the other quote (AF in the equation for BF, and vice versa), some
positive effect of higher price volatility on the frequency of quote revision,
and, finally, a weak and rather uncertain (the lagged variables usually had an
offsetting effect) effect from the quote size variables (BQ and AQ). We show
two of our better representative equations in table 4.28.
3
0
Once again, largely for the record, we ran associated regressions to examine
the determinants of the frequency of quote entry over FXFX. This showed that,
apart from own lagged values, the only variable, from the set of FXFX data
available examined here, that influenced the frequency of quote entry over
FXFX was a lagged volatility variable.
3
1 In order to save space, the table is not
shown but is available from the authors on request.
Finally, in this set of studies of activity on D2000-2 (and FXFX), we ex-
plored the determinants of the quantities posted, BQ and AQ. (Recall that we
chose not to seek to examine the determinants of the size of deal, BDQ and
ADQ, since these most often just exhausted the quantity already on offer.) A
noteworthy feature of our results is that the quantities posted, BQ and AQ, did
not significantly affect most of the preceding variables (e.g., probability of
30. We have no good explanation for the negative values for AD24 or ADA24 in the equation
shown in panel A of table 4.28, and we would again be inclined to regard these as chance findings.
31. This volatility variable was the absolute change in prices over the preceding half minute
(ADFXA in the ask equation and ADFXB in the bid equation).157 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
Table 4.26 The Determinants of Absolute Price Changes
A. In Bid Prices (adb)
Number of observations = 4,980
F(7,4973) = 78.3





Root MSE = .0002






















































B. In Ask Prices (ada)
Number of observations = 4,980
F(l 1,4969) =






























































deal, quote revision, spread) and only weakly affected, if at all, volatility and
the frequency of quote entry. Anyhow, the main factors affecting the quantities
offered, BQ and AQ, as shown in table 4.29, are the respective lagged depen-
dent variables, with strongly significant first-order positive autocorrelation (but
in the case of BQ thereafter a somewhat complex dynamic process), and the
number of prior deals (BD in the BQ equation, AD in the AQ equation), which158 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
Table 4.27 The Determinants of Absolute Price Changes on FXFX (adfxa)
Number of observations = 4,972
F(5,4966) = 51.7





Root MSE = .0002
Determinants of Absolute Price
Changes on FXFX (adfxa) Coefficient SE t P>\t\
adfxa6 .1366876 .0117699 11.613 .000
adfxal2 .0338006 .011855 2.851 .004
adfxa36 .0267606 .0095021 2.816 .005
s6 .0990903 .0258231 3.837 .000
dfxa6 .0375036 .008251 4.545 .000
cons .0000414 .0000187 2.220 .026
reduces quote size. Other activity variables, such as BF, AF, and BDQ, enter
weakly and often with offsetting signs, so their net effect is negligible. A vola-
tility variable (BV12) enters the BQ equation positively. The only factors, how-
ever, about which we have some confidence are those for the lagged dependent
variable and the negative effect of deal activity on quote size.
This extended series of results and tables must seem quite complicated, and
so in a manner it is. We try to simplify by illustrating, in figures 4.14a-c, the
main interrelations {excluding interactions whereby bid variables affect ask
variables, and vice versa), with the direction of causality given by the arrow,
the strong relationships displayed in figure 4.14a, the weak relationships in
figure 4.14b, and the questionable relationships in figure 4.14c. A key point is
that deals mainly affect quote (price) revisions, spreads, and volatility if they
have exhausted the amount then on offer, but with a much weaker effect other-
wise. This deal exhaustion effect is the main link from the deal occurrence/
frequency of quote revision nexus (one-way) to volatility and to the quote revi-
sion/spread nexus.
The exercises, whose results were reported in these figures, were mostly,
except for tables 4.19 and 4.22, done on a clock-time scale. We were both
encouraged and slightly surprised to find that, when we changed the periodic-
ity (table 4.17 compared with table 4.15) or the scale (table 4.18 compared
with table 4.19 and table 4.20 compared with table 4.22), the patterns of the
basic relations, as measured by the f-values on the key variables, remained
quite robust.
4.4.3 Conditional Heteroskedasticity in D2000-2
Most asset price series exhibit ARCH, autoregressive conditional hetero-
skedasticity. We next turned to examine whether our price series, DB and DA,159 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
Table 4.28























The Frequency of Quote Entry on D2000-2
A. Of Bid Prices (bf)
Number of observations = 4,980
F(ll,4969) = 26.6



















B. Of Ask Prices (af)
Number of observations = 4,980
F(8,4972) = 32.2






























































also had such characteristics, either in clock (five-second) time or on a tick-
by-tick (activity) scale. We could also explore whether the addition of transac-
tion data (e.g., BD, BDE) would influence the GARCH coefficients. Having
already examined the relation between the GARCH coefficients of the interpo-
lated D2000-2 and FXFX series in section 4.3, we now focus solely on the
former to investigate whether, in clock time or using a data set constructed
solely using quote and transaction activity, the series exhibit signs of condi-160 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
Table 4.29
























The Determinants of Quote Size
A. Bid Quote Size (bq)
Number of observations = 4,980
F(9,4971) = 329.2

















B. Ask Quote Size (aq)
Number of observations = 4,981
F(l 1,4970) = 235.6


































































tional heteroskedasticity. The basic specification that we used is shown below.
Quote revisions are assumed to depend on their own first lag and a dummy
indicating a deal that exhausted the quantity on offer at the prevailing price in
the previous period. The volatility expression is based on a simple
GARCH(1,1), extended subsequently to examine the effect of deals on vola-
tility:161 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
Quantity Quoted




Fig. 4.14a Strong relationships: main transmission channels
Quantity Quoted
Frequency of Revision / Quote Revision




Fig. 4.14b Weak relationships: but some clear effect
^Quantity Quoted






Fig. 4.14c Questionable relationships162 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
= a0 + a,A^_, + c^BDE,., + er, e, | /,_, ~ N(0, h,).
For brevity's sake, we report the results only for the bid side of the deutsche
mark/dollar, presented in tables 4.30 and 4.31.
Taking first the estimations for the quote revision equations, note that the
autoregressive parameter, a,, is negative in all cases but with a consistently
greater magnitude for the activity scale data, as previously reported when com-
paring tables 4.18 and 4.19 and tables 4.20 and 4.22. As before, the deal ex-
haust indicator has the expected negative effect on quote revisions.
Then, next inspecting the volatility estimations, GARCH effects are present
in both data sets. As shown in tables 4.30 and 4.31, the parameters (3, and
P2 are significantly different from zero in a standard GARCH(1,1). We then
examined whether deals affected quote revisions in an indirect manner through
the underlying volatility series. This was done by adding lagged deal and deal
exhaust indicators to the simple GARCH framework. For our activity scale
data, we could not uncover any real effect of deals on volatility. Neither of the





































Note: Presentation of the estimated parameters of the specification described in section 4.4.3 for
the five-second data set plus extended specifications including lagged deal and deal exhaust indica-
tors in the volatility expression.
"Significantly different from zero at 1 percent.
bSignificantly different from zero at 5 percent,



































Note: Presentation of the estimated parameters of the specification described in section 4.4.3 for
the activity-based data set plus extended specifications including lagged deal and deal exhaust
indicators in the volatility expression.
"Significantly different from zero at 1 percent.
bSignificantly different from zero at 5 percent,
insignificantly different from zero.163 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
estimation, and, indeed, their negative sign is implausible. But, when we
moved to the five-second data set, the results were markedly different. Both of
these variables had a positive effect on volatility, significant at the 5 percent
level. Maybe when the quiet no-change observations are excluded in the
activity-based data, the slighter persistent effects of deals on volatility become
drowned out in the noisier "news."
Indeed, in all cases, the GARCH estimates are far more significant in the
five-second, clock-time data set. Comparison of the ^-statistics between the
activity and the five-second data shows those in the latter case to be far greater.
This does not, however, imply that GARCH-type phenomena are better ad-
dressed in clock time than in activity time. It has been suggested that GARCH
effects apparent in clock-time data may be the result of the transformation of
a uniform, latent process that evolves on a different (activity) scale (see Stock
1988). This could underlie the diminished significance of the GARCH parame-
ters in the tick-time results. This, however, is a subject for further research and
is not pursued further here.
4.4.4 A Comparison with Hasbrouck's (1991) NYSE Study
Finally, in his 1991 study of the NYSE, Hasbrouck studied a bivariate VAR
of the interrelations between deals (and/or deal quantities) and price revision
(taking the middle of the bid-ask quote), scaling by activity, tick time. Here,
we show his main results (which he gives in his table II on p. 194) and our
replication from our own data, both in tick time as he ran the regressions and
in clock time, here reported in table 4.32.
Since the scales of the price changes in the two markets (NYSE and foreign
exchange) are markedly different, the differences between the absolute sizes
of the coefficients should be ignored and are not shown (but are available from
the authors). What matters is the size and pattern of the ^-values, as shown in
table 4.32. This shows that the equation for price quote revisions, the a and b
^-values in the first columns, are qualitatively similar. In both cases, although
considerably more strongly in the foreign exchange data, both in the clock-
time and in the activity-time equations, there is significant negative autocorre-
lation, and in both cases quote revisions are strongly positively related to prior
deals (i.e., a sell causes a drop in prices and a buy an appreciation). Like sev-
eral other economists, Hasbrouck tended to dismiss the negative autocorrela-
tion, noting that it "may simply arise from measurement error" (1991, 195);
our repeated findings of such negative autocorrelation on high-frequency for-
eign exchange data make us believe that this finding cannot be brushed aside
in this fashion. In the activity-based foreign exchange equation (column B),
we can explain considerably more of the fluctuations in quote revisions than
Hasbrouck, but this is primarily due to the stronger autocorrelation. (Has-
brouck does not report the F-statistic showing the combined effect of the x0
variable on r [in our case it is 10.25], but a look at the comparable f-statistics
suggests that the combined effect may be somewhat stronger in his equations.)



































































































Note: We estimate a five-lag near-VAR involving r,, the revision in the quote midpoint, and xOt,
the trade indicator variable. The VAR is not exact as the trade indicator is assumed to have a
contemporaneous effect on quote revisions, as shown in the system below:
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^-statistics are reported for each of the estimated parameters. Column A reproduces Hasbrouck's
results, column B gives our equivalent activity-scale results, and column C gives our results on a
clock-time basis.
the second set of equations for the event of deals. In Hasbrouck's equation,
price quote revisions have a significant negative effect on deals; the first two c
coefficients have t-values well below —2. In our own work, as reported in ta-
bles 4.15 and 4.16 above, price quote revisions have little, or no, effect on the
probability of deals occurring, and this (negative) finding recurs also here.
Both in Hasbrouck's results and in our own, there is positive autocorrelation in
deal events, slightly stronger in his case than in either of our two runs. So,
although the fit in all cases is close to zero, Hasbrouck can "explain" rather
more of deal eventuality than we can. Hasbrouck notes that "a negative relation
between trades and lagged quote revisions is consistent with inventory control
effects since a monopolistic marketmaker with an inventory surplus would re-
duce his quotes to elicit more purchases. It is also consistent with the price
experimentation hypothesis of Leach and Madhavan (1989) in which the mar-
ketmaker sets quotes to extract information optimally from the traders. These
possibilities are deserving of further study" (1991, 295). In this further study,
we find that, in our data sample from a market with many competing mar-
ketmakers, there was no indication of any significant (negative) effect between
trades and lagged quote revisions.
In addition, we examined whether our results were robust to a longer lag
structure (ten instead of five); the answer was yes. We were also able to repli-
cate with our data the exercises done by Hasbrouck (1991) in his tables III (p.
198) and V (p. 203). In table III, Hasbrouck examines the interrelations be-165 A
Table 4.33
Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
Comparison of Coefficients
Own Lags x0 x
Hasbrouck 32.29 .98 5.89





tween r, price quote revisions, x0, the event of a deal, x, the size of a deal
(- for sales, + for purchases), and x
2 = x0' \ x |
2« Our results (the data are
available on request from the authors) show generally less effect of the deal
(x) variables on quote revisions. Unlike in Hasbrouck, neither the x nor the x
2
variables have a significant effect on r; only the x0 variables do. Like Has-
brouck, we find that none of the variables, even the lagged dependent variables,
can help much to explain x, the size of deals; indeed, as in his study, the lagged
event of a deal JC0 is very slightly better at explaining x, the size of deals, than
lags of x themselves. Again, as in Hasbrouck's work, neither the size nor the
squared size of deals, x and x
2, has any effect on the eventuality of deals, JC0—
indeed, even less in our data than in his.
Finally, we look at the determinants of the spread. In his table V (1991,
203), Hasbrouck regresses the spread, for his particular equity share, Ames
Department Stores, on its own (five) lags and the absolute values of the current
and five lagged values of x0, x, and x
2. The f-statistics for the sums of these
variables—and for comparison on our data (activity scale only)—are as shown
in table 4.33. This shows that the extent of the positive autocorrelation of
spreads is even larger in our data than in his. Otherwise, the significance of
deals in our data set is rather less than in his and works in our own case primar-
ily through x0, the event of a deal, rather than its size (or squared size). In
particular, Hasbrouck finds some general tendency for the effect of x (on quote
revisions and spreads) to be positive and for x
2 to be negative, which we do not
find in our data set; but this is very likely because of the manner in which deal
size was limited by the usually small size of the quote on offer in our data set,
as earlier described.
4.4.5 Conclusions
It is now time to summarize this long, and often quite complex, study of
the interrelations and determinants of the variables that can be extracted from
D2000-2: for example, event, price, and size of deal, and whether an order
exhausts the prior quote; the frequency of entry, price, size, and volatility of
prices for both the bid and the ask; and the spread between them. Let us do so
by reviewing our main findings.
1. Unlike the price quote series, which exhibits highly significant negative
autocorrelation at high frequencies, the transaction price series exhibits no
strong signs of autocorrelation (there is an insignificant negative first-order166 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
autocorrelation balanced by just significant higher-order positive autocorrela-
tion). If one could not observe the "bounce" between deals at the bid and ask,
the transactions series would then appear to exhibit weak negative first-order
autocorrelation.
2. Tests of length of runs of deals at the bid and ask suggest that these have
a fat (long) tail, which in this data set appears to be associated with strong
price trends.
3. Studies of interactions between the many variables available from
D2000-2 suggest a close interrelation (nexus) between quote frequency and
deals (two-way causality) and between quote (price) changes and the spread
(two-way causality). These two nexuses are linked, in that a deal that exhausts
the amount offered at a previously quoted price will cause a price change both
directly and indirectly via its effect on the spread (both directly and again
indirectly by raising volatility). Deals that do not exhaust the amount on offer
have a much weaker effect. There are only weak relations (in either direction)
between the quantities (posted) and any of the other variables in the system.
4. Unlike a single dealer system, where the dealer will normally adjust both
bid and ask quotes simultaneously, in this multiple competitive dealer system
the bids and asks are normally input by different banks. There is no automatic
reason why bid quotes should be revised in response to changes in ask quotes
(or deals). In practice here, they did not respond much to such activity on the
other side. Instead, price changes on one side primarily affected the spread and
thence gradually the quote on the other side, with the spread acting as an error
correction mechanism between the cointegrated bid and ask series.
5. The main pattern of relations reported in point 3 above appear to be en-
couragingly robust, as evidenced by the similarity of r-values, to changes in
either the periodicity or the scale over which the regressions were run.
6. On the other hand, the GARCH equations varied considerably when run
in clock-time rather than on an activity scale. The results for the former were
more intuitive.
7. We were able to run an exact comparison, and replication, of Hasbrouck's
(1991) study of transaction/quote relations in the NYSE. The main difference
between us is that in his study lagged quote revisions have a significant (nega-
tive) effect on deals, whereas there is no such interaction in our data set.
4.5 Tailpiece
We have already summarized our main findings at the ends of sections 4.3
and 4.4. Here, we wish to emphasize again how short our data period was, only
seven hours. Our findings should, therefore, be treated with due caution. By
the same token, there would be considerable value, not only to academics but
also to practitioners, in obtaining additional data of this high-quality format.
We hope, and expect, that such data will become more widely available soon.167 A Study of the Reuters D2000-2 Dealing System
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Comment Richard K. Lyons
The authors do a lovely job with an important topic. The paper provides much
information. Keeping it in perspective, however, is crucial. Accordingly, the
first part of my comment provides perspective on precisely where these data
fit in. The second part addresses the specific results of the paper.
Some Perspective
This paper is about spot trading. It is important to keep this straight. For
example, when the Bank for International Settlements writes of a $1 trillion
daily "foreign exchange market," many market segments are being lumped to-
gether: spot, forward, swaps, futures, and options (see BIS 1993). Care should
be exercised when using aggregated BIS statistics to discuss the spot segment
in particular. The authors themselves occasionally lapse (e.g., when discussing
the market share of automated dealing systems, they refer to BIS data that are
not from the spot segment alone).
Let me telescope further. Spot trading accounts for about half the foreign
exchange total. Mark/dollar is the largest spot market by a margin, accounting
for about a third of trading. Now, within spot markets, there are two main
types of participants: dealers and customers. By customers I mean here any
participant that does not provide two-way prices (e.g., corporate treasurers,
investors, hedge-fund managers, liquidity traders, central banks, etc.). About
85 percent of spot mark/dollar trading is between dealers.
1
It is this interdealer trading that produces the D2000-2 data in this paper.
Moreover, the data come from a particular type of interdealer trading, namely,
brokered trading. There are two basic types, direct and brokered. Direct inter-
dealer trades involve communication between the counterparties only. Price
and quantity from these trades are not observed by others. In contrast, brokered
trading involves prices that are advertised to dealers generally, as described in
their section 4.2 (customers do not have access to interdealer brokers, elec-
tronic or otherwise). In spot mark/dollar, about two-thirds of interdealer trades
are direct, and the remaining third are brokered.
2
It is important, in my judgment, not to overemphasize the distinction be-
tween electronic (screen-based) trading and voice-based trading. More im-
Richard K. Lyons is associate professor in the Haas School of Business at the University of
California, Berkeley, and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
1. Table 1-B in BIS (1993) reports that customer-dealer trades account for about 12 percent of
the total in spot mark/dollar. Calling the remaining 88 percent interdealer would be an overesti-
mate, however. That report includes a third category of participant called other financial institu-
tions that accounts for another 12 percent. This category includes nonreporting banks, which in
many countries includes investment banks, some of which are important in dealing. (That dealers
are included in this third category is evidenced by the significant brokered trading of this category;
in general, only dealers have access to brokers.) Since this third category does include some "cus-
tomers" by my definition (e.g., insurance companies and pension funds), 85 percent is a reasonable
conjecture for the interdealer share.
2. Note that table VI of BIS (1993) does not report brokered shares for the spot market alone.
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portant is the above distinction between brokered and direct trading, both of
which have electronic and voice-based options. The D2000-2 system that the
authors track competes with traditional voice-based brokerage.
3 Another Reu-
ters system, called Dealing 2000-1, is an electronic means for direct trading.
Like voice-based direct trading, only the counterparties communicate when
using Dealing 2000-1. Thus, speaking of "electronic dealing systems" without
separating direct and brokered trading can be misleading since they involve
very different dissemination of information.
With the above as background, here is a concentric rings model to organize
the data sources referred to in the paper. There are three rings. The inner ring
is direct interdealer trading. The Dealing 2000-1 data used in Lyons (1995; see
also Lyons, chap. 5 in this volume) is from this inner ring. In mark/dollar,
spreads in this inner ring are typically three to four pips for large banks when
trading is active (London afternoon/New York morning). The second ring is
brokered interdealer trading. The authors' D2000-2 data are from this second
ring. Spreads in this ring are typically five to six pips when trading is active
(here, I have large brokers in mind, which D2000-2 was not in 1993).
4 The
third ring is customer-dealer trading. Although transaction data from this ring
are not currently available, my experience with dealers is that spreads are in
the seven to twelve pip range for large customers (circa 1993). I view the indic-
ative FXFX data as targeted at this third ring. That is, for most customers, this
indicative series is the best real-time indicator of where the market is trading.
Clearly, FXFX is not targeted at dealers since live broker quotes are more in-
formative and they are easy to monitor continuously.
This leads to an issue that I do not believe has been addressed adequately in
past work using FXFX: Exactly who inputs these indications at any given
bank? And how? Stop to think for a moment about how rational it would be to
pay a veteran dealer to input indicative quotes while trading, say, a billion dol-
lars a day. No. It is much less expensive to hire a dependable young person to
sit within earshot and intermittently type in a five or ten pip price based on
where the dealer is actually trading. Better yet, why not build in some automa-
ticity? For example, write a program that captures the dealer's firm Dealing
2000-1 quotes and widens them for customer consumption. A better under-
standing of this entry process would shed light on why the series has the
properties it does. Let me suggest that the clustering of the FXFX spreads at
3. When I asked a spot mark/dollar dealer what market share broker systems like D2000-2
would have in five years, his response was essentially the following: "Currently, traditional brokers
have about a third of the interdealer market, the rest being direct. Five years from now, I would
guess that electronic brokers will have about half that third, traditional brokers the other half of
that third, and direct will remain about two-thirds. There will always be a need for direct dealing."
Admittedly, this is just one person's view, but tempered with experience nonetheless.
4. So why use a broker if direct prices are tighter (and brokers also charge a commission)?
Smaller banks often do not have access to the tighter spreads among large banks. Large banks
often prefer wider advertisement of their prices than bilateral direct quoting provides. Keep in
mind that a large bank inputting the best bid, e.g., still buys at the bid side if a second bank hits
that bid (it is the second bank that sells at the bid). Pretrade anonymity may also be valuable.182 Charles Goodhart, Takatoshi Ito, and Richard Payne
five and ten pips indicates that considerable automaticity is indeed built in
(fig. 4.12).
Their Results
The authors present a fearsome array of results. In my judgment, this is
appropriate given that their paper is the first study of its kind. This requires,
however, that readers draw their own conclusions about what is most important
to take away. The following is my take on it.
First, the paper brings to sharp relief the fact that there is no monolithic
entity called the spot market. Even within mark/dollar, there are different ways
to trade and different classes of participants. Consequently, there are many
different sources of data. No one source provides a complete picture. The idea
that D2000-2 is the market and therefore the ultimate benchmark is over-
wrought (and the authors are duly cautious here). That said, these are transac-
tions data, and in that sense they represent market activity in a way indicative
FXFX data cannot.
With the authors' caution in mind, the three central take-ways appear to be
the following. First, FXFX provides an excellent image of the level of market
price as it evolves over time. Second, FXFX is a poor indicator of how market
spreads vary over time. Third, FXFX provides little information regarding trad-
ing volume (whether through entry frequency or otherwise).
Another result that I find interesting is their finding that the negative auto-
correlation in returns disappears when transaction prices are used. The nega-
tive autocorrelation in FXFX quotes is well documented and piqued enough
interest that people had begun theorizing as to why it occurs. The fact that
transaction prices do not exhibit this will surely affect how we think about it.
Of course, as the authors point out, the reason that the quotes are autocorrel-
ated while the transaction prices are not is an interesting topic in itself.
Two ways in which the paper might be clearer are the following. First, the
text bounces a bit too much from comparative mode (D2000-2 vs. FXFX) to
focus mode (the properties of D2000-2 data per se). Although section 4.3
would appear to contain the comparative analysis, in fact the authors fre-
quently compare the series elsewhere. This makes it difficult at times to know
when the text is referring only to D2000-2. Second, in various places the text
discusses "negative moving average" and "negative autocorrelation" without
intending any distinction (as far as I can tell). Further, the term reversal is now
commonly used in this literature to describe negative autocorrelation and
would help readers less familiar with time-series work on returns.
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